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PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSION TO
INTESTATE PROPERTY
Many of the problems involved in the law of descent and
distribution of property are among the most difficult prob-
lems of legal science. While the principles of the branch of
the law are covered generally and specifically by statutes,
in more or less complete schemes, both in this country and
in England, yet without a knowledge of the common law
principles and the reasons for them it is not infrequently
very difficult to interpret and apply the statute in any par-
ticular jurisdiction in cases arising under it and to under-
stand the terminology used in the statute. It is with the im-
plications of these problems in mind that I have collected
herein readings and materials on the law of succession to
intestate property, adding comment and illustrations. I have
dealt mainly with general principles, for individual teachers
and students are inclined to use local material-both statu-
tory and cases.
There are two general modes of acquiring title to real
property, namely, by descent and by purchase. Personal
property is not without the scope of this general classifica-
tion; but as to the operative effect on the title acquired un-
der either method, the distinction is not so important as it
is in case of real property. In distinguishing these modes
of acquiring title, Blackstone says: "Purchase, perquisito,
taken in its largest and most extensive sense, is thus de-
fined by Littleton: 'The possession of lands and tenements,
which a man hath by his own act or agreement, and not by
descent from any of his ancestors or kindred.' In this case
it is contradistinguished from acquisition by right of blood,
and includes every other method of coming to an estate, but
merely that by inheritance, wherein the title is vested in a
person, not by his own act or agreement, but by the single
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6peratlon of law." I The same author defines "descent" as
follows: "Descent, or hereditary succession, is the title
whereby a man on the death of his ancestor acquires his es-
tate by right of representation, as his heir at law. An heir,
therefore, is he upon whom the law casts the estate im-
mediately on the death of the ancestor; and an estate so
descending to the heir is in law called the inheritance." 2
"The word 'distribution' refers ordinarily to personal prop-
erty. It is defined by Bouvier as 'the division by order of.
the court having authority, among those entitled thereto,
of the residue of the personal estate of an intestate after
payment of the debts and charges.' This definition is fol-
lowed by the statement: 'The term sometimes denotes the
division of a residue of both real and personal estate, and
also the division of an estate according to the terms of a
will.' "I "It is true that the word 'descent,' in its technical
legal meaning, denotes the transmission of real estate, or
some interest therein, on the death of the owner intestate,
by inheritance, to some person according to certain rules of
law. In such meaning it is distinguished from transmission
by devise, which is technically by purchase, and also from
the transmission of personal property, the title of which
passes to the administrator, and, after the payment of debts
and claims against the estate, is governed by certain rules
1 2 BL. CoMr. (Lewis' ed.) 241. While this work will be cited frequently
hereafter without stating the edition, it is Lewis' edition to which reference is
made, unless otherwise indicated.
Bouvier says that "This division of the manner of acquiring title to real estate
does not appear to be entirely correct; the title gained by escheat, forfeiture and
merger, is acquired by act of law as well as by descent. A more natural classifica-
tion would be by considering, first, when title to estates is acquired by act of
law; secondly, when by acts of the parties. Among the first would be classed
descent, escheat, forfeiture, merger; under the second class, alienation, devise,
occupancy, prescription, and custom, treated of under two divisions." 2 Bouv=sR's
INsTr.uTEs 352.
2 2 BL. Com-m. 201.
"'Descents This word cometh of the latin word descendere, id est, ex loco
superiore in. inferiorem movere; and in legal understanding it is taken when
land, & c. after the death of the ancestor is cast by course of law upon, the heir,
which the law calleth a descent." 2 CoKE 183.
8 Knight v. Gregory, 333 Ill. 643, 165 N. E. 208, 210 (1929).
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of distribution." " Andrew says' that in England the follow-
ing formal modes of acquiring title by purchase existed:
Feoffment, grant, fine, common recovery, exchange, release
and confirmation, grant of reversion with attornment, bar-
gain and sale, and devise. He adds that other collateral
methods existed, namely, accretion, prescription, dedica-
tion, estoppel, partition, and by judgment. A discussion of
the essentials of these methods of acquiring title by purchase
is beyond the scope of this paper, except in so far as a dis-
tinction between any of them and that of acquiring title
by descent is necessary in connection with a consideration
of some principle in the law of descent.6
Intestate succession applies to estates of persons who die
intestate or leave no valid wills disposing of their property,
thereby requiring the descent and distribution of their prop-
erty in accordance with the laws providing therefor.' It de-
notes the devolution of property under the statutes of de-
scent and distribution. "Succession by law is the title by
which a man, on the death of his ancestor, dying intestate,
acquires his estate, whether real or personal, by the right
of representation as. his next heir." 8 "Succession" is, there-
fore, a broader term than "descent," as it applies to per-
sonal as well as real property. Yet the two terms are often
used synonymously. "The word 'inheritance,' in its legal ac-
ceptation, applies to lands descended . . . In its popular
acceptation, however, the word 'inheritance' includes the
4 Hudnall v, Ham, 172 I1. 76, 83, 49 N. E. 985, 987 (1898).
5 2 ANDnaWS, AammCAw LAW (2nd ed.) 1131.
6 The distinction between acquiring title by descent and by purchase has
been of importance in some cases construing the word "purchaser" in recording
statutes. Speilman v. Kliest, 36 N. J. Eq. 199 (1882). It has been of importance,
also, in certain types of questions in statutory construction. See Hudnall v.
Ham, op. cit. supra note 4.
7 Attorney General ex rel. Treasurer v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 110 N. E.
299, L. R. A. 1916C, 679, 681 (1915).
8 HALAxX ANAsysis oF Crvm LAW 47 (Quoted in Hunt v. Hunt, 37 Me.
333, 344 (1853).).
"'Succession' is a proper term to denote the devolution of title to property
from an ancestor to his immediate heir." Per Owen, J., in In re Bradley's Estate,
185 WVis. 393, 201 N. W. 973, 38 A. L. R. 1 (1925).
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devolution of both real and personal property, and is co-
extensive in meaning with the word 'succession.'" 9  "'Suc-
cession,' in the civil law, denotes the transmission of the
rights and obligations of a deceased person to his heir or
heirs." ' 0 This would include succession arising by devises
and that which arises by operation of law.
The words "next of kin" refer to the persons who suc-
ceed to intestate personal property; the word "heirs" re-
fers to the persons who succeed to intestate real property.
These definitions will, in a general way, serve to distinguish
between the classes of persons who succeed to the two class-
es of intestate property. In this country all jurisdictions have
statutes providing more or less complete schemes of succes-
sion to intestate property. In a few there are separate pro-
visions for realty and personalty; in these jurisdictions the
heirs and the next of kin (also called "distributees") may
be different persons. In most jurisdictions in this country
and under the recent statutes in England one course of suc-
cession is provided for realty and personalty, thus eliminat-
ing the necessity for making any distinction. Not infre-
quently it is necessary to arrive at the meaning of the words
"legal heirs" and "next of kin" in interpreting wills; and
in construing survival statutes and administration statutes 11
it is often necessary to decide who are the "next of kin."
"Next of kin" may have reference to the nearest in blood,
where distribution is to made to those "who are in equal
degree equally." 12 The word "heirs" in its legal sense is
interpreted to mean heirs generally. This is an important
consideration in the law of estates tail. To create a fee tail,
the limitation 6ver to the donee's heirs must be to a certain
class of his heirs and not to his general heirs."3
9 Adams v. Akerlund, 169 [JR. 632, 48 N. E. 454, 457 (1897).
20 Op. cit. supra note 9.
11 State v. Superior Court for King County, 158 Wash. 546, 291 Pac. 481,
70 A. L. R. 1460 (1930).
12 Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482, 40 S. W. (2d) 393 (1931).
18 Richman v. Hoppin, 45 Fed. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
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The principles of descent were, carefully formulated at
common law. In England the law of descent, until recently,
consisted of a number of common law principles based on
feudalism. The first statutory modification was made in
1833. Professors Pollock and Maitland, in their History of
English Law, 4 say that the common law principles of de-
scent assumed final form at the end of Henry III's reign. It
seems that they were referring to the main outlines of de-
scent. Professors Reppy and Tompkins, in their Historical
and Statutory Background of the Law of Wills, Descent and
Distribution, Probate and Administration, say that the com-
mon law rules of descent "were first formulated into definite
shape by Sir Matthew Hale, but they found. a more perfect
expression in what are known as Blackstone's Canons of
Descent, seven in number." '-
While the principles of descent were carefully formulated
at common law, according to the spirit of the feudal system,
personalty was practically ignored. The disposition of per-
sonal property was left to a different system. The ordinary,
at the early common law, had the absolute disposal of intes-
tate personalty. He was not bound, further than in con-
science, to pay the debts of the intestate. "The Statute of
Westminister 2, ch. 19, 13th Edw. 1st, subjected the ordinary
to the suit of creditors, as executors were." 16 In practice, the
ordinary usually distributed the personalty "to the wife and
children, and kindred of the intestate, according to the cus-
tomary law, which agreed with the civil law, as it existed
before the time of Justinian, by which, if there were no
children, the father was preferred to all others, excluding
the mother." " Under a later statute 18 the ordinary was
"bound to grant administration to the nearest and most law-
14 Vol. 2 (2nd ed.) 260.
15 Pp. 77, 78.
16 Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355, 360 (1828).
17 Davis v. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 380.
I8 31st, EDW. 3rd.
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ful friends of the deceased; and this is the origin of admin-
istrators." 19 "Still the ecclesiastical courts exercised juris-
diction over the subject. They granted administration, they
called the administrators to account, and undertook to dis-
tribute the surplus of the personal estate among the kindred
of the intestate, according to the rules of the civil law....
And this was deemed so reasonable that it was tolerated for
a long time, and the ordinaries, in the bonds taken of the
administrators to account with them, usually inserted a
clause that the overplus upon such account should be dis-
tributed as the ordinary should appoint. This matter was at
length brought before the law courts, and they decided that
the bonds of the administrator were of no avail and he not
compellable to make distribution at all. And as often after-
wards as the ecclesiastical courts attempted to compel a dis-
tribution, a prohibition was granted," '0 on the ground that,
by the grant of administration, the ecclesiastical authority
was executed, and ought to interfere no further. Thus the
administrator was. entitled, exclusively, to enjoy the residue
of the personal property of the intestate, after the payment
of debts and funeral expenses.2
"The hardships of this privilege upon those of kin to the
intestate in equal degree with the administrator was the
occasion of the making of the Statute of Distributions" 22
in 1670." It has been said, frequently, that this Statute
was passed at the instance of the Civilians; that the reason
for passing it was to end the contention between the Com-
mon Law and the Ecclesiastical Courts; that its main scope
was to enlarge the jurisdiction of the latter; that it was bor-
19 Op. cit. supra note 16.
20 Davis v. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 360, 361.
21 WmUAms, A TRATisE ON THE LAw or EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
(3rd Am. ed.) 1271.
22 VILLIAMS, oP. cit. supra note 21, at 1272.
23 22 & 23. CAR. II, c. 10.
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rowed from the Civil Law, and was to be construed accord-
ing to the rules of that Code. 4
"The provisions of this Law stand in striking contrast
with the Canons of Descent of the Common Law. Primogen-
iture, the preference of males over females, the blood of the
24 Davis v. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 361.
"The Statute of Distributions was drawn by a civilian, Sir Walter Walker,
and seems to have been intended to introduce the rules of the Roman Civil
Law into this branch of English law." In re Ross' Trusts, L. R. 13 Eq. Cas. 286,
293 (1871).
"It is obvious to observe how near a resemblance this Statute of Distrbu-
tions bears to the ancient English law, de rationabili parte bonorum, which Sir
Edward Coke... held to be universally binding, in point of conscience at least, on
the administrator or executor, in case of either a total or partial intestacy. It also
bears some resemblance to the Roman law of succession ab intestato, which, and
because the Act was also penned by an eminent civilian, has occasioned a
notion that the Parliament of England copied it from the Roman praetor, though
it is little more than a restoration, with some refinements and regulations, of
our old constitutional law, which prevailed as an established right and custom,
from the time of King Canute downwards, many centuries before Justinian's
laws were known or heard of in the Western parts of Europe. Lord Hardwicke, in
the case of Stanley v. Stanley [1 Atk. 457], took occasion to observe that this
statute was very incorrectly penned." WuzLAmus, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1274,
1275.
In dealing with the historical contention of counsel in In re Youngs, 132
N. Y. S. 689 (1911), the court said: "There is no doubt recognized judicial
authority for their claim that the original 'Statute of Distributions' was founded
on the 118th Novel of Justin n .... For a long time material differences in
principle have, however, been noticed in the course of critical comparison of
the Statute of Distributions with the 114th and 127th Novels of Justinian.
4 Burns' Ecc. Law, 555. . . That the Statute of Distributions was founded on
the Justinian scheme modern historical scholars have come to doubt. That
statute probably finds its logical and immediate origin in the sequence of ancient
customs of English-speaking peoples, as those customs were established in the
reign of Charles II; but more particularly in the ancient practice of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts in granting letters of administration. . . . The ecclesiastics, though
canonists, and civilians, were eminently practical men, and they were, above
all, Englishmen. Whether or not the customs and practice of the ecclesiastical
courts in England do not in some respects go back in turn to a time anterior
to even the legislation of Justinian is one of the interesting problems of modern
historical scholarship, as yet, I believe, in this instance, unsolved."
In Carter v. Crawley, Raym. T. 496 (1680), the court, in explaining the
Statute of Distributions, said: "The statute is introductivum nwvis iuris, and
therefore ought to receive a strict interpretation in restraint of distributions, which
are hereby introduced against the policy of former laws. . . . As to
the rules of the Spiritual Courts in ordering distribution, I should
have been glad the parties would have brought civilians to have in-
formed us concerning the grounds of their law and practice in this particular.
Not having had that assistance, I have considered in the best manner I can upon
the nature of the thing, whereupon I apprehend there are two motives of dis-
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first purchaser, the rule that property never ascends, the
exclusion of the half blood, all these fundamental rules of
the Common Law are violated by the Statute of Distribu-.
tions. Its great object was equality." 2 5
This Statute provided that ordinaries and judges, having
power "to commit administration of the goods of persqns
dying intestate, shall and may," upon the granting of ad-
ministration, take a bond of the administrator, with two or
more sureties; (2) call the administrator to account "for
and touching the goods of" the intestate; and (3) upon
a hearing, to order a distribution of what remained, after
all debts, funeral expenses and just expenses of every sort
were paid, "amongst the wife and .children, or children's
children if any such be or otherwise to the next of kindred
to the dead person in equall degree, or legally representating
their stocks pro sua cuique jure according to the lawes in*
such cases and the rules and limitation hereafter sett
down .... ' It then provided that the surplus should be
digtributed: One third to the wife of the intestate, and all
the residue by equal portions to and amongst the children,
and such persons as represent the children in case any of
the children have predeceased the intestate; if no children,
or representatives of children, survive the intestate, "one
moyety" to the wife, and the residue to the next of kindred
in equal degree and those who legally represent them. Rep-
tribution, one in respect of the intestate, another in respect of the Ordinary that
grants administration. In respect of the intestate it may be thought an obliga-
tion upon every man to provide for those which descend from his loins; and
as the administrator is to discharge all other debts, so this debt to nature should
likewise exact a distribution, to all that descend from him in lineal degrees, be
they ever so remote. . In respect of the. Ordinary it may be considered that
those that are of equal degree aid next of kin, be they ever so many, ought to be
looked upon with an equal eye, therefore when he has preferred one to the
administration, he ought to give some recompense to the others, that he may
not appear partial, they being as capable to demand and have administration
as the other." Here we see the English courts, in interpreting the Statute of
Distributions, pursuing the presumed will of the intestate, and adopting the
principle of equality of partition. And the court apparently was not guided by
the rules and practices of the civilians, in its exposition of the statute.
25 Davis v. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at 361.
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resentation among collaterals after brothers' and sisters'
children was prohibited.26
While statutes exist in all of the states in this country
directing the distribution of intestate personalty and the
descent of intestate realty, these statutes are generally based
on the English Statute of Distributions of 1670. The pro-
visions of this Statute, and the interpretations of it in the
English cases, are guides in this country in the construction
and application of similar statutory provisions.
The Canons of Descent and all existing modes and rules
of descent were expressly abolished in England in 1925 by
The Adminisration of Estates Act.2 7 A complete scheme of
succession is set forth in this statute, covering both realty
and personalty. The principle of lineal descent in the first
canon and to some extent the doctrines of the fourth and
fifth canons are preserved by the statutes in this country.2"
Other principles of the common law, such as the parentelic
method of computing heirs,29 the doctrine of ancestral prop-
26 The Law of Property Act of 1922 (c. 16) repealed these provisions as
from January 1, 1926. "There is no saving as to deaths before 1926, and the
omission of such a saving would appear to be a mistake." Note, 5 TE Com-
PLETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1929) 116.
27 § 45.
28 MECHEM AND ATIcxNsoN, CASES ON WILLS AND ADm-isTRATIoN 594.
29 Distribution of intestate property among collaterals according to the
parentelic scheme, as opposed to the gradual scheme, is preserved to some ex-
tent under some statutes in this country. For instance, the Massachusetts (GEN.
LAws OF MASS. (Tercentenary ed. 1932) c. 190, § 3) and Michigan (Coarr.an
LAws or Micia. (1929) § 13440) statutes on intestate succession provide that
if there are two or more collateral kindred in equal degree but claiming through
different ancestors, those claiming through the nearest ancestor shall be pre-
ferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote. According to such
a statutory provision, a nephew would be preferred to an uncle of the intestate
(See Knapp v. Windsor & Wife, 60 Mass. 156, 162 (1850)), though under either
the civil law or the common law method of computing next of kin they would
be equally related to the deceased.
"Whilst in the Common Law of Descents, full effect was allowed to the op-
eration of this principle of natural equity [namely, that of representation] since
it had no tendency to frustrate the policy of preserving estates entire, that object
being most effectually secured by the sole succession of the eldest male, and the
preference of male to female lines. It was upon this principle of natural equity,
too, that the Common Law of Descents, instead of selecting, amongst collaterals,
the kinsman of the intestate nearest in degree to him without regard to the de-
gree of their common ancestor, according to the Civil Law and the Statute of
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erty and the common law method of computing degrees of
relationship 30 have been adopted by statute to some extent
in this country. The common law rule that the legal title con-
trols the course of descent is applicable generally in this
country.
The inquiry as to what particular species of property
descends to the heir of -the intestate, and what passes to
the next of kin, has often led to much controversy. This
question is beyond the scope of this paper.
The law of succession involves the inquiry as to who
are the heirs of an intestate on whom the estate devolves.
They may be lineal descendants, such as children, grand-
children, or great-grandchildren, or lineal ascendants, such
as parents or grandparents, or collateral kindred, such as
brothers and sisters, cousins, aunts and uncles, or nephews.
This inquiry is the one to which this paper is mainly de-
voted.
The law of succession involves the inquiry as to, the per-
sons capable of inheriting, such as aliens, bastards and
posthumous children. The law in respect to these classes of
heirs, as well as that in respect to adopted children, will
be considered herein.
Also, the doctrine of equitable conversion and its effect
on succession will be considered.
The persons who are entitled to take intestate property
may be either the lineal descendants or lineal ascendants or
the collateral kindred of the intestate. In order to define
Distributions, preferred the more remote kinsman descended from the child of
the nearest common ancestor, as representing and standing in the place of that
child, to a nearer kinsman, the child or other descendant of a more remote an-
cestor, and in this particular, our Stattite pursues the principles of the Common
Law, and the Statute of Distributions." Davis v. Rowe, op. cit. supra note 16, at
392, 393.
30 Wetter v. Hahersham, 60 Ga. 193 (1878); Ector v. Grant, 112 Ga. 557,
37 S. E. 984, 53 L. R. A. 723 (1901); Paul v. Carter, 153 N. 0. 26, 68 S E.
905 (1910); Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N. C. 393, 160 S. E. 365 (1931); CArnL's
CONSOIATED LAWS or NEw YORX (1923) c. 13, § 92 (This section of the New
York Decedent Estate Law was omitted in the Laws of 1929.).
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these classes of heirs more clearly, "it must first, be ob-
served, that by law no inheritance can vest nor can any per-
son be the actual complete heir of another, till the ancestor
is previously dead. Nemo est haeres viventis [No one is heir
to the living]. Before that time the person who is next in
the line of succession is called an heir apparent, or heir pre-
sum ptive. Heirs apparent are such whose right of inheritance
is indefeasible, provided they outlive the ancestor. 31 ...
Heirs presumptive are such who, if the ancestor should die
immediately, would in the present circumstances of things
be his heirs, but whose right of inheritance may be defeated
by the contingency of some nearer heir being born, as a
brother or nephew, whose presumptive succession may be
destroyed by the birth of a child... ))82
As Coke said, "by the common law he is only heir which
succeedeth by right of blood." In order to succeed to an
estate of inheritance, the person claiming to be heir had to be
related by blood to the ancestor leaving the estate. Rela-
tionship of individuals by blood is known as consanguinity.
As applied to collateral heirs, this term means that the col-
lateral heir is descended from the same ancestor as the
intestate. Affinity is a connection formed by marriage. This
term is used in contradistinction to consanguinity. Bouvier
says: "Affinity, or, as it is sometimes called, alliance, is very
different from kindred. Kindred are relations by blood;
affinity is the tie which exists between one of the spouses
and the kindred of the other. Thus the relations of my
wife, her brothers, her sisters, her uncles, are allied to me by
affinity... But my brother and the sister of my wife are not
allied by the ties of affinity." "'
Consanguinity is either lineal or collateral. Lineal con-
sanguinity is that which subsists between persons, of whom
31 Under the Canons of Descent, the eldest son or his issue was a good
example. 2 BL. Comm. 208.
32 Op. cit. supra note 31.
88 2 Bouvx's INsTmTus 364.
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one is" descended in a direct line from the other, as be-
tween father and son. Thus John Stiles, in Table I, is a
lineal descendant of his father, Geoffrey Stiles; Matthew
Stiles, the grandchild of Geoffrey Stiles, is a lineal descend-
ant of Geoffrey Stiles. And so upwards in the ascending line,
Geoffrey Stiles is a lineal ascendent of John Stiles or Mat-
thew Stiles. Collateral consanguinity is that which subsists
between persons who are descendants of a common ancestor.
Thus brothers are collaterally related to each other, and so
are their respective offspring. Again the intestate and his
cousin-german are collaterally related, because both descend
from a common grandfather. Collateral kinsmen differ from
lineal kinsmen in that the latter descend one from the other;
they agree in that they descend from the same ancestor or
stock.
In computing the degree of relationship of a collateral
relative or kinsman to the intestate, two general modes were
applied in England: The gradual Scheme and the parentelic
scheme. According to the gradual scheme, each generation
constitutes a degree, reckoning upwards or downwards. In
discussing the gradual scheme, Holdsworth says: "You take
a given propositzis [the person whose relations are sought
to be ascertained by a genealogical table], and you reckon
as a degree each step from him to the person whose rela-
tionship you are seeking to determine. Thus a son is one de-
gree from his father, two degrees from his brother, three de-
grees from his brother's son." 85
84 "Line is the series of persons who have descended from a common an-
cestor, placed one under the other, in the order of their birth. It connects suc-
cessively all the relations by blood to each other.. . Each generation lengthens
the line and adds one degree to it. . . The word degree is a metaphorical ex-
pression borrowed from the steps of a ladder or of stairs; the kindred descend-
ing from their common ancestor, from generation to generation, are as so many
steps in a stairs, or so many rounds in a ladder.
"The degree of kindred is established by the number of generations." 2
Bouvnm's INSTxrTuTs 355, 356.
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Pollock and Maitland explain the parentelic scheme as
follows: "By a person's parentela is meant the sum of those
persons.who trace their blood from him. My issue are my
parentela; my father's issue are his parentela. Now in our
English scheme the various parentelae are successively called
to the inheritance in the order of their proximity to the
dead man. My father's parentela is nearer to me than my
grandfather's. Every person who is in my father's parentela
is nearer to me than any person who can claim kinship
through some ancestor remoter from me than my father ....
The rule then becomes this: Exhaust the dead man's paren-
tela; next exhaust his father's parentela; next his grand-
father's; next his great-grandfather's. We see the family






"The remotest kinsman who stands in Parentela I is a
nearer heir than the nearest kinsman of Parentela II. Be-
tween persons who stand in different parentelae there can
be no competition." 86
36 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (2nd ed.) 296.
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The parentelic scheme was applied in England in the law
of succession to realty."'
In this country the parentelic scheme has been adopted
to some extent in some of the statutes.8 Otherwise, it does
not appear to be applied in any jurisdiction.
The gradual scheme was applied in England in the law
of succession to personalty. 9
The authorities generally state that there are two methods
of computing proximity of relationship, that is, in deter-
mining the nearest collateral kinsman, namely, that of the
civil law and that of the canon law, which was adopted by
the common law. The common law and canon law method
was to begin with the common ancestor of the deceased
and the person whose relationship to him is to be deter-
mined, and count down to each one, each generation being
one degree or step; and in whatever degree the more dis-
tant is removed from the common ancestor is the degree
in which they are related. Thus the deceased is related to
his brother in the first degree; to his cousin-german, uncle
and nephew all in the second degree; and to his grand-
nephew and -first cousin once removed (second cousin) in
the third degree. The civil law method is to count from
the deceased to the common ancestor and then downward
from him to the person whose relaiionship to him is to be
determined, reckoning one degree for each generation,. and
the total number of steps indicates the degree of relation-
ship. Thus the deceased is related to his cousin-german and
grand-nephew in the fourth degree; to his nephew and uncle
in the third degree; to his brother in the second degree; and
to his first cousin once removed in the fifth degree.
Let us take the illustration in Table III on the next
page. Suppose John Stiles dies intestate, and we seek to
37 Op. dt. supra note 35.
38 Op. cit. supra note 29.
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determine the degree of relationship to him of Charles Stiles,
nephew, and Robert Stiles, cousin-german. The common
ancestor of the cousin-german and John Stiles is the grand-
father of the latter. There are two degrees up to the com-
mon ancestor from John Stiles, and two degrees down to
the cousin-german from the common ancestor. The degree
on kinship is determined by the number of steps in the long-
est line; so the cousin-german is related to John Stiles in
the second degree. In case of the nephew, he is related to
John Stiles in the second degree, also, under the common
law and canon law. According to the civil law, we would in
case of the cousin-german count up to the common ancestor
and down to the cousin-german, the total number of steps
determining the degree of kinship, which would be the
fourth degree; and in case of the nephew, he would be re-
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lated to John Stiles in the third degree. Thus, under the
civil law the nephew would be one degree nearer to John
Stiles than the cousin-german.
4 0
Every generation in lineal consanguinity constitutes a
different degree, reckoning upward or downward. This meth-
od of computing degrees of kinship in the direct line ob-
tains in the civil, canon and common law. It is in the col-
lateral line only that the civil law method differs from that
of the canon and common law.
In discussing the difference between the gradual and the








which I have set forth as Table IV. He says: "Let 0 be the
propositus. 0 to F equal five degrees, reckoning up to A
and down to F. 0 to B equal four degrees. Thus if you
reckon according to the gradual scheme B is nearer to 0
than F. Now let us see what happens if you reckon accord-
ing to the parentelic scheme. Seeing that 0 has no descend-
40 The child of A.'s uncle or aunt is A.'s cousin-german (or first cousin);
and the child of A.'s first cousin (or cousin-german is A.s first cousin once re-
moved (or second cousin); and the child of A's first cousin once removed (or
second cousin) is A.s third cousin. The children of first cousins are second
cousins to each other, and the children of second cousins are third cousins to
each other. WEBsTR's Naw INTENATIoNAL DICTIONARY (118) 519.
The child of A/s great-uncle is A.'s first cousin once removed (or second
cousin). Table HI is designed to assist one in determining the blood relationship
existing between persons.
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ants, you look first at C to see if he has any descendants. He
has none. You then go to A and take his descendants in or-
der. If D and E be dead, F will take . .. for, as we have
seen, neither A nor C can take because they are direct
ascendants. Thus F, though farther from 0 than B, if we
reckon by the gradual scheme, is nearer if we reckon by the
parentelic.
"Both the Year Books and the text writers show us that
it is the parentelic scheme which is the basis of the law of
inheritance. We will take an instance from one of the earliest
Year Books of Edward I's reign. In a case reported in 1293
[Y. B. 21, 22 Ed. I. (R. S.) 36, 38]. . . the pedigree [in











"The plaintiff traced his claim from John, and contend-
ed that as neither Thomas, nor Jurdan the grandfather, nor
Jurdan the great-grandfather had left issue, the land must
descend to the issue--the parentela-of X, of which he, W,
was the representative. He was met by the assertion that
'Jurdan the great-grandfather had a son named Jurdan and
(the son had) a sister named Agnes, which Agnes had a son
named Laurence, who is still alive; and if there is to be a
resort, it should be to Agnes, the sister of Jurdan the grand-
father and to Laurence, the son of Agnes, rather than to
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Emma, the sister of the great-grandfather.' The other side
could not answer this reasoning except by the averment
that Agnes was illegitimate. Britton [ii 325] thus states the
principle:---For default of heirs who would have made a
degree in the direct line, the right shall descend to one who
shall be found in the collateral line, and for default of a de-
gree in the collateral, the right shall resort again to the
direct line at a higher degree, and if it find that degree full
it shall attach there; if not, it shall go on descending in the
collateral line, and so of all the other degrees.' "41
Pollock and Maitland say that whether the parentelic
scheme of computing proximity of kinship "is of extremely
ancient date, or whether it is the outcome of feudalism, is
a controverted question which cannot be decided by our
English books and records. We can only say that in the
thirteenth century it seems to be among Englishmen the
only conceivable scheme. Our text-writers accept it as ob-
vious... 42
So the parentelic scheme is the basis of the law of suc-
cession to real property at the common law in England. The
civil law method is the one used in computing next of kin un-
der the English Statute of Distributions of 1670. There ap-
pears to be .no scope of operation for the canon law and
common law method of computing proximity of kinship
at the common law and under the Statute of Distributions
in England, as far as succession to property is concerned.43
41 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 35, at 146, 147.
42 PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 36, at 297.
43 As to collateral relationship within which marriage was forbidden under
the early English law, see 32 HEN. VIII, c. 38. In LORD COxE'S FIRST IN-
STITUTE, Vol. 2, p. 158, wherein he states the common law method, a marginal
reference is made to the statute of 32 HEN. VIII, c. 39. In the Canon Law
it is provided that in the collateral line marriage is invalid to the third degree
inclusively. 5 AuGusTINE, A COMMENTARY ON THE Naw CODE OF CANON LAw,
Canon 1076; Whitman, The Law of Christian Marriage, 7 NOTRE DAME
LAWY. 146, 163, 164. This would extend to and include first cousins once re-
moved (br second cousins).
Probably the common law method of computing degrees of relationship was
applied only with respect to the eligibility of relatives to contract marriage.
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There is apparently no instance in the law of succession to
property in England where the common law method of
computing proximity of kinship has been applied.
In this country the statutes generally name ceitain rel-
atives and the order in which they shall succeed to intestate
property. In so far as this is done, the statute is control-
ing; but it not infrequently occurs that none of the speci-
fied relatives survive the intestate, and then it becomes im-
portant to determine proximity of kinship in the matter of
succession to his property. Generally the question is one of
interpreting the expression "next of kin" or determining who
the "heirs" are or who the "heir" is that is entitled to suc-
ceed to the intestate property. The general rule is, either
by statute or judicial construction, that the civil law meth-
od controls. In a few jurisdictions the common law or canon
law method has been adopted.44
The right to inherit property or to succeed to property
is said, in most cases that have dealt with this question,
to be a mere creature of the law, a civil right and not a
natural right.45 This does not mean, however, that the right
is not recognized at common law. 6 Yet in some cases the
courts have said that the right is wholly a creature of stat-
ute.4" In a comparatively recent Wisconsin case 48 the right
is declared to be a natural right which cannot be wholly
taken away or substantially impaired by legislation. The
various ramifications involved in this question are beyond
the scope of this discussion. Even under the Wisconsin
44 See authorities cited in note 30, supra.
"In Maryland a statute provides: 'If there be no widow or relations within
the fifth degree, which shall be reckoned by counting down from the common
ancestor to the more remote, the whole surplus shall belong to the State ...
for the use of the public schools. . . ' Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 93,
§ 140." MECHEM AND ATKINSON, Op. cit. supra note 28, at 7, note 2.
45 DESCENT AND DisnTIBunoN, 18 C. J. 804, and authorities cited.
46 Op. cit. supra note 45.
47 Op. cit. supra note 45.
48 Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)
121, 9 Ann. Cas. 711 (1906).
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view, it is admitted that reasonable regulations of the sub-
ject of succession may be made, such as prescribing lines
of descent, limiting ihe persons who may take as heirs or
devisees, and including collateral heirs or cutting them off
entirely in the succession. 9
Under the general rule that, except where restricted by
constitutional or treaty provisions, the state has plenary
power over the descent and distribution of property with-
in its borders, the problem of statutory construction exists.
It is said the general rules of statutory construction are ap-
plicable to statutes of descent and distribution.50 This prob-
lem is complicated because of the following factors: (1)
Sonie states have statutes expressly adopting the common
law of England; and (2) The statute involved in a given
case in this country may have been based on the English
Statute of Distributions of 1670. The first. factor may be
eliminated on the theory that the state statute in contro-
versy may include a complete scheme of succession and so
supercede the common law.5' Where the particular state
statute is based on the English Statute, the judicial con-
struction placed on that Statute, in so far as it is similar to
the state statute, is generally adopted.
BLACKSTONE'S CANONS OF DESCENT
"I. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally de-
scend to the issue of the person who last died actually seised
in infinitum, but shall never lineally ascend."
Blackstone's Comment on this canon. ". . no person
can be properly such an ancestor, as that an inheritance of
49 Op. cit. supra note 48.
50 DscT A- D=smuTr~onN, 18 C. '. 806.
51 See: Kochersperger v. Drake, 47 N. E. 321 (M. 1897); Steinhagen v.
Trull, 151 N. E. 250 (IMI. 1926).
Notwithstanding the so-called completeness of the statutory scheme, there
are certain common law principles that may be applied.
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lands or tenements can be derived from him, unless he
hath had actual seisin of such lands, either by his own
entry, or by the possession of his own or his ancestor's
lessee for years, or by receiving rent from a lessee of a
freehold, or unless he hath had what is equivalent to cor-
poral seisin in hereditaments that are incorporeal, such as
the receipt of rent, a presentation to the church in case
of an advowson, and the like. But he shall not be accounted
an ancestor, who hath had only a bare right or title to enter
or be otherwise seised. And, therefore, all the cases which
will be mentioned in the present chapter 'are upon the sup-
position that the deceased (whose inheritance is now
claimed) was the last person actually seised thereof. For
the law requires this notoriety of possession, as evidence
that the ancestor had that property in himself, which is now
to be transmitted to his heirs .... The seisin, therefore, of
any person, thus understood, makes him the root or stock,
from which all future inheritance by right of blood must
be derived, which is very briefly expressed in this maxim,
seisina facit stipitem [seisin makes the stock].
"When, therefore, a person dies so seised, the inheritance
first goes to his issue; as if there be Geoffrey, John, and
Matthew, grandfather, father, and son, and John purchases
lands, and dies, his son Matthew shall succeed him as heir,
and not the grandfather Geoffrey, to whom the land shall
never ascend, but shall rather escheat to the lord.
"This rule, so far as it is affirmative and relates to lineal
descents, is almost universally adopted by all nations; and
it seems founded on a principle of natural reason, that
(whenever a right of property transmissible to representa-
tives is admitted) the possessions of the parents should go,
upon their decease, in the first place to their children, as
those to whom they have given being, and for whom they
are therefore bound to provide. But the negative branch,
or total exclusion of parents and all lineal ancestors from
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succeeding to the inheritance of their offspring, is peculiar
to our own laws, and such as have been deduced from the
same original. For, by the Jewish law, on failure of issue,
the father succeeded to the son in exclusion of brethren,
unless one of them married the widow and raised up seed
to his brother. And by the laws of Rome, in the first place,
the children or lineal descendants, were preferred; and on
failure of these, the father and mother or lineal ascendants
succeeded together with the brethren and sisters; though
by the law of the twelve tables the mother was originally,
on account of her sex, excluded. Hence this rule of our
laws has been censured and declaimed against as absurd,
and derogating from the maxims of equity and natural jus-
tice. Yet that there is nothing unjust or absurd in it, but
that on the contrary it is founded upon very good legal rea-
son, may appear from considering as well the nature of the
rule itself, as the occasion of introducing it into our laws.
"We are to reflect, in the first place, that all rules of
succession to estates are creatures of the civil polity, and
juris positivi [of positive law] merely. The right of prop-
erty, which is gained by occupancy, extends naturally no
further than the life of the present possessor, after which
the land, by the law of nature, would again become common,
and liable to be seised by the next occupant; but society,
to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue from a doctrine
so productive of contention, has established conveyances,
wills, and successions, whereby the property originally gained
by possession is continued and transmitted from one man to
another, according to the rules which each state has re-
spectively thought proper to prescribe. There is certainly,
therefore, no injustice done to individuals, whatever be the
path of descent marked out by the municipal law.
"If we next consider the time and occasion of introducing
this rule into our law, we shall find it to have been grounded
upon very substantial reasons. I think there is no doubt to
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be made, but that it was introduced at the same time with,
and in consequence of, the feodal tenures. For it was an
express rule of the feodal law, that successionis feudi talis
est natura, quod ascendentes non succeedunt [the nature of
feudal succession is such that those in the ascending line
do not inherit]. . . . Our Henry the First indeed, among
other restorations of the old Saxon laws, restored the right
of succession in the ascending line; but this soon fell again
into disuse, for so early as Glanvil's time, who wrote under
Henry the Second, we find it laid down as established law
that haereditas nunquam ascendit [the inheritance never
ascends], which has remained an invariable maxim ever
since. The circumstances evidently show this rule to be of
feodal original; and taken in that light, there are some
arguments in its favor, besides those which are drawn merely
from the reason of the thing. For if the feud of which the
son died seised was really feudum antiquum [an ancient
fee], or one descended to him from his ancestors, the father
could not possible succeed to it, because it must have passed
him in the course of descent, before it could come to the
son; unless it were feudum maternum, or one descended
from his mother, and then for other reasons ... the father
could in no wise inherit it [as he did not derive his blood
from the purchaser]. And if it were feudum novum [a new
fee], or one newly acquired by the son, then only the de-
scendants from the body of the feudatory himself could
succeed, by the known maxim of the early feodal constitu-
tions, which was founded as well upon the personal merit of
the vassal, which might be transmitted to his children, but
could not ascend to his progenitors, as also upon this consid-
eration of military policy, that the decrepit grandsire of a
vigorous vassal would be but indifferently qualified to suc-
ceed him in his feodal services. Nay, even if this feudum
novum were held by the son ut jeudum antiquum, or with
all the qualities annexed to a feud descended from his
ancestors, such feud must in all respects have descended
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as if it had been really an ancient feud; and there-
fore could not go to the father because if it had been an
ancient feud the father must have been dead before it
could have come to the son. Thus whether the feud was
strictly novum, or strictly antiquum, or whether it was
novum held ut antiquum, in none of these cases the father
could possibly succeed. These reasons, drawn from the his-
tory of the rule itself, seem to be more satisfactory than
that quaint one of Bracton, adopted by Sir Edward Coke,
which regulates the descent of lands according to the laws
of gravitation." I
Lineal ascendants entitled to inherit as collateral descend-
ants, in some instances. In commenting on lineal ascent,
Stephen says: "Such at least have been alleged . . . as the
reasons of the rule which excluded the ascending line. The
reasoning, however, was not consistently applied, for it has
been justly observed, that if the father is not to inherit
the estate, because it must be presumed to have already
passed him in the course of descent, the elder brother
should, upon the same principle, never be heir to the young-
er; and if the object is merely to pass over a decrepit feuda-
tory, the father's eldest brother should never succeed to his
nephew; and yet a succession in both these collateral lines
was always permitted by law." 2
In Cruise's Digest is a very interesting discussion on lineal
ascent: "'If (says Littleton, § 3) there be father and son,
and the father hath a brother that is uncle to the son, and
the son purchase land in fee simple, and die without issue,
living his father; the uncle shall have the land, as heir to the
son, and not the father, yet the father is nearer of blood,
because it is a maxim in law, that inheritance may lineally
descend, but not ascend. Yet if the son, in this case, die
1 2 BL. Comm. 209, 210, 211, 212.
2 1 STEPN, NF-w COMMEN=ApS ON Tim LAWS OF ENGLAND (Partly
founded on Blackstone.) (5th ed.) 413, 414.
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without issue and his uncle enter into the land, as heir to
the son, as by law he ought, and after the uncle dieth with-
out issue living, the father shall have the land, as heir to
the uncle, and not as heir to the son.'
"Lord Coke has observed on this passage, that if the
uncle does not enter the father cannot inherit from him,
because he must make himself heir to the person last seised,
which the uncle was not; for the person last seised was the
son, to whom the father cannot make himself heir.
"A father or mother may, however, be cousin to their
own child, and in that relation may inherit from him, not-
withstanding the relation of father or mother.
"A son died seised of lands in fee, without issue, or brother
or sister, but leaving two cousins his heirs at law, one of
whom was his own mother; and the question was whether
the mother could take as heir to her son. It was determined
by Sir. J. Jekyll, M. R. [in Eastwood v. Vincke, 2 P. Wins.
614], that though a father or mother could not, as father
or mother, inherit immediately after their son, yet if the
case should so happen, that the father or mother were
cousin to the son, and as such his heir, they might take
notwithstanding; and that here, though the heir was also
mother, this did not hinder her from taking in the capacity
or relation of cousin." 3
The Exclusion of Ascendants from the Inheritance. If an
intestate left no lineal descendants the common law rule
was that ascendants were incapable of inheriting his realty.
The realty would escheat rather than go to a lineal ascend-
ant. It was not easy to find an explanation for this rule.
Bracton resorted to a metaphor. An inheritance was said
to descend; it was said to be like a heavy body which falls
downward. It could not fall upward. Pollock and Maitland
criticised this explanation as follows: "We cannot say that
'3 CRUISE'S DIGEST (1827) 231.
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the inheritance always descends, for in the language of
Bracton's time it is capable of 'resorting,' of bounding back.
My land can not ascend to my father, but it can resort to
my father's brother. Thus we are driven to say that, though
the heavy body may rebound, it never rebounds along a
perpendicular line. These legal physics, however, are but
afterthoughts." I
The reason, based on the feudal system, that Blackstone
advanced, was not applied consistently in practice. If the
father of an intestate did not succeed to the inheritance
because it was presumed to have passed him in the course
of descent, the same reason would have excluded an elder
brother from taking an estate by descent -from a younger.
If the inheritance did not pass to the father of the intestate,
lest the lord would have been attended by an aged, decrepit
feudatory, the same reason would have been still stronger
to have excluded the father's eldest brother from the in-
heritance. Yet both of these classes of relatives were ad-
mitted to an inheritance at the common law.5
Section 6 of the Inheritance Act I of 1833 in England pro-
vides that "Every lineal ancestor shall be capable of being
heir to any of his issue; and in every case where there shall
be no issue of the purchaser, his nearest lineal ancestor
shall be his heir in preference to any person who would have
been entitled to inherit, either by tracing his descent through
such lineal ancestor, or in consequence of there being no
descendant of such lineal ancestor, so that the father shall
be preferred to a brother or sister, and a more remote lineal
ancestor to any of his issue, other than a nearer lineal an-
cestor or his issue." There seems to be only one case in
which this statute has been construed to any extent. In
Re Don's Estate I it is said that the word "ancestor" is used
4 2 POLLOCZ AND MAT, IxD, Tim HISToRY or ENGLISHt LAW (2nd ed.) 286.
5 2 BL. COMM. 212, note 35.
6 3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 106.
7 4 Drew. 194, 62 Eng. Rep. 75 (1857).
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in its popular sense as meaning progenitor, as distinguished
from its technical meaning in which it is put in opposition to
"heir" (in which sense it is said that a younger brother
may be the ancestor of his elder brother) ; and "the father
is to come next before the brothers, who before the Act
would have been the persons to take in default of issue."
While the father would have priority over the mother of
the intestate, under this statute, the mother would not be
entirely excluded. Female relatives or descendants were only
postponed to male descendants, under the Canons of De-
scent. It seems, also, that the parentelic scheme of computing
proximity of kinship is not eliminated from consideration
by this statute. Thus, if the intestate leaves no issue or par-
ents, the brothers and sisters would be called to the inherit-
ance next in order; and the descendants of the latter classes
would take in preference to grandparents.
Section 46 of The Administration of Estates Act of 1925
in England,9 in providing the order of succession to intestate
realty and personalty, includes parents and grandparents.
There is no lineal ascent beyond grandparents.
Under the Statute of Distributions of 1670 in England
lineal ascendants were entitled to succeed to the property
of an intestate. If the intestate left no issue surviving him,
his father, if living at the time of the death of the child in-
testate, succeeded to the child's personalty.'0 It appears
that the father was entitled to the personalty to the exclu-
sion of the mother." The reasons are obvious. If the in-
testate was survived by his mother, but not by any issue,
father, or brothers or sisters, the mother was entitled to all
of his personalty. i2 If the intestate was not survived by
children, but was survived by a wife and father, his per-
8 Re Don's Estate, op. cit. supra note 7.
9 15 Gw. 5, c. 23.
10 Bacon v. Bryant, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 425, 22 Eng. Rep. 361 (1729); Grice
v. Goodwin, Prec. Ch. 260, 24 Eng. Rep. 126 (1706).
11 Grice v. Goodwin, oP. cit. supra note 10.
12 Jackson v. Proudehome, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 439, 22 Eng. Rep. 374 (1716)
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sonalty went in moieties to the wife and father. But the
Statute of 1 Jac. 2, c. 17, provided "That if after the death
-of the father any of his children should die intestate, with-
out wife or children, in the lifetime of the mother, every
brother and sister and the representatives of them shall
have an equal share with the mother." According to the
provisions of this statute, if the intestate was not survived
by children or father, but was survived by his mother and
brothers and sisters, or the representatives of the latter
(nephews and nieces), and a wife, the wife was entitled to
a moiety, and the other moiety was divided between the
mother and these collaterals.'s Before this Statute of James,
the mother would have been entitled to a moiety and the
wife a moiety.1'
Generally, under the Statute of Distributions in England,
the Civil Law method of computing degrees of proximity of
kinship has been applied.15 But there was one exception. Ac-
cording to the Civil Law, the brother and the grandmother
of an intestate would be related to him in equal degree of
consanguinity. It is said that the Civil Law preferred the
grandmother to the brother or any other person in the col-
lateral line, as she was in the lineal ascending line. 6 But
the English chancellors preferred the brother to the grand-
mother, in the distribution of intestate personalty, on the
ground that the brother made title immediately from his
deceased brother, while the grandmother could only claim
mediately through the father of the deceased." Neverthe-
13 Kellway v. Keilway, Gilb. Rep. 189, 25 Eng. Rep. 133 (1726).
14 Keylway v. Keylway, 2 P. Wms. 344, 2.4 Eng. Rep. 758 (1726).
The purpose of -the Statute of James was to prevent the possibility of the
mother marrying again and transferring all the personalty, she acquired from
the child, to another husband. Blackborough v. Davis, 1 P. Wins. 41, 49, 24 Eng.
Rep. 285, 288 (1701).
15 Mentney v. Petty, Prec. Ch. 593, 24 Eng. Rep. 266 (1722).
16. Earl of Winchelsea v. Norcliff, 2 Freem. 95, 22 Eng. Rep. 1080 (1686).
And see Note to this case in 22 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081.
17 Earl of Winchelsea v. Norcliff, op. cit. supra note 16; Note, 22 Eng.
Rep. 1080, 1081; Collingwood and Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 424, 86 Eng. Rep. 262, 269
(1664). While the latter case was decided before the passage of the Statute of
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less, if the intestate left no nearer kindred than a grand-
father or grandmother and uncles and aunts, the grand-
father or grandmother was preferred, under the Statute of
Distributions, both as to distribution of personalty and as
to administration, the grandfather or grandmother being
in the second degree and the uncles and aunts being in the
third degree."8 But great-grandfathers or great-grand-
mothers, being in the third degree, were entitled to dis-
tributive shares with uncles and aunts.'" As between paternal
and maternal lineal ascendants, however, there was no pref-
erence, for dignity of blood was not regarded as material
under the Statute of Distributions. Thus if the intestate left
a paternal grandfather and a maternal grandmother, as the
only next of kin, his personalty was divided equally be-
tween them.2 °
Lineal ascendants were entitled to inherit, under the
Civil Law. In Cooper's Justinian 21 the Civil Law rules are
stated as follows: If the intestate left no descendants, his
father or mother, or any other surviving relatives, in the
ascending line, inherited in preference to collaterals, ex-
cept brothers and sisters. If there were ascendants, the near-
est in degree were preferred, whether male or female, wheth-
er descended from the paternal or maternal line. A father
or mother would have excluded an ascendant in a more
remote degree. If the intestate left no father or mother, but
several ascendants in equal degree, the property was not
always divided equally between them; but one half was
Distributions, it was approved by Chief Justice Holt in Blackborough v. Davis,
op. cit. supra note 14.
18 Blackborough v. Davis, op. cit. supra note 14; Woodroff v. Wickworth,
Prec. Ch. 527, 24 Eng. Rep. 236 (1719).
"It has been expressly held that the grandfather is next of kin before an aunt
or uncle, and which is the necessary result when the degrees are computed by
the Civil Law ... Phillips v. Peteet, 35 Ala. 696." Cox v. Clark, 93 Ala. 400, 9
So. 457, 458 (1891).
19 See Lloyd v. Tench, 2 Ves. Sen. 213, 215, 28 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 (1750).
20 Moore v. Barham, cited in Blackborough v. Davis, op. cit. supra note 14.
21 P. 543.
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given to the ascendants representing the father, whatever
their number, and the other half to the ascendants repre-
senting the mother.
Under the statutes in this country, the Civil Law method
of distributing an intestate's property among his ascendants
is not followed. The general tendency in the statutes has
been to distribute an intestate's property among his next
of kin in equal degree, making no distinction between ascend-
ants and descendants, and between kindred on the father's
side and those on the mother's side. This problem was in-
volved in Knapp v. Windsor & wife.2" The claimants of the
property of the intestate, in this case, were a paternal grand-
mother and the maternal grandfather and grandmother. It
was argued that, in accordance with the Civil Law rule,
one half of the inheritance went to the grandparent on the
father's side and the other half went to the two grandpar-
ents on the mother's side. But the court held that each
grandparent, being a next of kin in equal degree, under the
Massachusetts statute, took a third. The court said: "It
is quite manifest.. . that this kind of representation among
ascendants, so that one half shall go to the paternal ances-
tors, and one half to the maternal, without regard to num-
bers, on each side, has no existence and no analogy in our
law, and therefore that the rule of the civil law, founded
upon positive enactment, and not on an~j great principle
of general equity, can throw little light on the subject, or
have any weight in deciding the present question."
Due to the diversity of statutes in this country, we can
not formulate any general rules as inheritance by lineal
ascendants. There is no definite uniformity in the provisions
22 60 Mass. 156 (18Sf).
Where the ancestral property doctrine is not applicable, the Supreme Court
of Michigan says that as between the paternal grandmother and the maternal
grandnxther -of the intestate, they would share equally, since they are of the
same degree of kindred. In re Wortman's Estate, 210 Mich. 541, 177 N. W.
967 (1920).
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of the various statutes. Professor Reppy says: "Thus, for
example, in some states both parents may take, Harrison v.
Harrison (1916) 21 N. M. 372, L. R. A. 1916E, 854, 155
Pac. 356; Brown v. Baraboo (1895) 90 Wis. 151, 30 L. R.
A. 320, 62 N. W. 921; in some the father is preferred over
the mother, Matter of Kane (1902) 38 Misc. 276, 77 N. Y.
S. 874; Wright v. Wright (1898) 100 Tenn. 313, 45 S. W.
672; in a few the parent takes only a life estate, Konutz v.
Davis (1879) 34 Ark. 590; in still others, such as Illinois,
where there are surviving brothers and sisters, the parent
shares with the brothers and sisters, but takes a double
portion, Cronkhite v. Strain (1904) 210 Ill. 331, 71 N. E.
392." 28
Seisina facit stipitem. Kent discusses this maxim as
follows: "By the common law, the ancestor from whom the
inheritance was taken by descent, must have had actual
seisin, or seisin in deed, of the lands, either by his own en-
try, or by the possession of his, or his ancestor's, lessee
for years, or by being in the receipt of rent from the
lessee of the freehold, in order to transmit it to his heir.
The heir, to be entitled to take in that character, must b.e
the nearest male heir of the whole blood to the person who
was last actually seised of the freehold. ... It is this seisin
23 REPPY, CASES ON THB LAW Or SUccEssioN 130, note 59.
In Smith v. Gaines, 35 N. J. Eq. 65, 66 (1882), the court said: "The first
canon of descent declares that inheritances shall never linealy ascend. This canon,
though modified by statute so as to let in the father, and also the mother to a
limited extent, in certain designated junctures, is still in force in this State."
In Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Koviacs, 26 Colo. App. 554, 144 Pac. 863
(1914), the words "lineal heirs," used in a statute giving a right of action for
wrongful death, were interpreted to include a father or mother.
The words "next of kin in equal degree" include grandparents. See Knapp
v. Windsor & wife, op. cit. supra note 22.
Where the real estate of an intestate descends equally to his father and
mother, it has been held that they take as tenants in common and by moieties,
and not by entireties; and upon the death of one of the parents, the other sur-
viving, the share of the deceased parent does not go to the survivor, by right
of srvivorship. Brown v. Baraboo, 90 Wis. 151, 62 N. W. 921, 30 L. R. A. 320
(1895). This rule is to be distinguished from the common law rule applicable
where real estate is granted to a husband and wife; in such a case they take
by entireties, and not by moieties. The survivor would take the whole.
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which makes a person the stirps or stock from which all
future inheritance by right of blood is derived.... If, there-
fore, the heir, on whom the inheritance was cast by descent,
dies before he has acquired the requisite seisin, his ancestor,
and not himself, becomes the person last seised .of the in-
heritance, and to whom the claimants must make themselves
heirs." 24
Under this Canon, seisin creates the root or stock of de-
scent; without seisin there could be no propositus. For one
to succeed to the realty of another, as a lineal descendant,
it was necessary that the latter (the propositus) be seised.
One could not transmit title to his lineal descendants, un-
der this Canon, unless he had the requisite seisin. If the
supposed propositus was himself an heir to another person
and outlived that other person but died before entry (that
is, before he had acquired a seisin), he could not transmit
the interest he otherwise would have had to his own lineal
descendants. For a person to be a propositus or an ancestor,
so that an inheritance of lands or tenements could be de-
rived from him, he had to have an actual seisin of such lands
or tenements, either by his own entry, or by the possession
of his own or his ancestor's lessee for years, or by receiving
rent from a lessee of the freehold, or have the equivalent of a
corporal seisin in hereditaments that are incorporeal, such
as receipts of rent, the presentation to the church in case
of an advowson, and the like. No one was considered an
ancestor who had only a bare right to enter.
The nature of the seisin which a person (the supposed
ancestor or pro positus) acquired, and which would, under
this Canon, constitute him an ancestor, to whom a claim-
ant sought to make himself an heir, either lineal or collateral,
24 4 KENT's Comm. (14th ed.) 385, 386.
Thus, where A. died intestate and seised of Blackacre, leaving B. as his
heir, and B. died before entry, leaving C. as his heir, but, at the death of B.,
D. was heir of A., D. would inherit Blackacre, and C. would not be entitled to
inherit any interest in Blackacre. C., not being an heir of the person last seised,
could not inherit Blackacre.
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depended materially on the question of whether the estate
had been obtained by the person (the supposed ancestor or
propositus) by descent or by purchase. Where one obtained
hereditaments by purchase, and such hereditaments were of
a corporeal nature, he generally acquired at the same time
the corporal seisin or possession. Where the transfer was
founded on feudal principles, it was attended with actual
livery of seisin. In some instances where the supposed an-
cestor acquired an estate by purchase, he could transmit
it to his heirs without having had an actual seisin. Kent
gives several instances: ' "... if, upon an exchange of lands,
one party had entered, and the other had not, and died be-
fore entry, his heir would still take by descent, for he
could not take in any other capacity. It is likewise the rule
in equity, that if a person be entitled to a real estate by
contract, and dies before it be conveyed, his equitable title
descends to his heirs. The possession of a tenant for years
is the possession of the person entitled to the freehold; so
that one who has a reversion or remainder in fee expectant
upon the determination of a term for years, is in the actual.
seisin of his estate, for the possession of the termor is in
law that of the remainderman or reversioner. There may
also be a seisin of a remainder, or reversion expectant upon
a freehold estate. The seisin or possession of one parcencer
or tenant in common is the seisin and possession of the
other. So, also, the possession of a guardian in socage is
the possession of his infant ward, and, sufficient to constitute
the technical possessio fratris,2" and transmit the inheritance
25 4 KEN.'s CoMm. 386, 387, 388.
26 This is a technical term applied in the law of descent to denote the
possession by one in such privity with another person as to be considered the
latter's own possession. Of some inheritances, such as remainders, reversions,
and executory devices, there could be no seisin, or possessio fratris; "and if
they are reserved or granted to A. and his heirs, he who is heir to A. when
they come into possession is entitled to them by descent, that is, that the person
who would have been heir to A. if A. had lived so long and had then died
actually seised." 2 BL. Comm. 228, note 76.
For a good illustration and discussion of this doctrine, see Goodtitle v. New-
man, 3 Wil. 516, 95 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1774).
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to the sister of the whole blood. If the estate be out in a
freehold lease when the father dies, then there is not such
possession in the son as to create the possessio fratris. The
tenancy for life in a third person suspends the descent, un-
less the son enters in his lifetime, or receives rent after the
expiration of the life estate. It is a well-settled rule of the
common law, that if the person owning the remainder or
reversion expectant upon the determination of a freehold
estate, dies during the continuance of the particular estate,
the remainder or reversion does not descend to his heir, be-
cause he never had a seisin to render him the stock or term-
inus of an inheritance. The intervention of the estate of free-
hold between the possession and the absolute fee prevents
the owner of the fee from becoming the stock of inheritance,
if he dies during the continuance of the life estate. The es-
tate will descend to the person who is heir to him who
created the freehold estate, provided the remainder or re-
version descends from him; or if the expectant estate had
been purchased, then he must make himself heir to the first
purchaser of such remainder or reversion at the time when
it comes into possession. The purchaser becomes a new stock
of descent, and on his death the estate passes directly to
his heir at law, He takes the inheritance, though he may be
a stranger to all the mesne reversioners and remaindermen,
through whom the inheritance had devolved. .. . Should
the person entitled in remainder or reversion exercise an act
of ownership over it, as by conveying it for his own life, it
would be an alteration of the estate sufficient to create in
him a new stock or root of inheritance. It would be deemed
equal to an entry upon a descent." 27
27 In Stringer v. New, 9 Mod. 363, 88 Eng. Rep. 509 (1741), A. was tenant
for life, with a remainder in tail and a reversion in fee expectant. He conveyed
to B., by lease and release. His father was the devisor, creating these estates.
A. had a sister of the half blood, who was a daughter of his father by a former
venter; he had also a sister of the whole blood. The court held that A..had
altered the course of descent as to the reversion in fee, so as to constitute him-
self a new stock of descent, saying that if he had not altered the course of
descent, the reversion in fee would have descended "to the sister of the half
blood, who was the elder daughter, and equally heir to the father with" the
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I have considered seisin only with respect to lineal de-
scendants. Its importance with respect to collateral relations
will be considered under Canon V. The Administration of
Estates Act in England abolishes "all existing modes; rules
and canons of descent," and prescribes, with some excep-
tions, a course of devolution for both realty and personalty.
The doctrine included in the maxim seisina facit stipitem has
no scope of operation under the provisions of this Act.
This common law doctrine was followed by the courts in
some of the early decisions in this country. Now it has
been abrogated in most, if not all, states, so that property
descends without regard to the maxim non jus, sed seisina
facit stipitem (not right, but seisin makes a stock from
which the inheritance must descend). The statutes in this
country have generally altered the common law rule; and
they extend title by descent generally to all the real estate
owned by the intestate ancestor at his death, including every
interest and right, legal and equitable, in lands, tenements,
and hereditaments, either seised or possessed by the intes-
tate, or to which he was in any manner entitled." If the
intestate has any interest in or ownership of the property in
question, regardless of seisin, he is the propositus in the law
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(To be continued.)
other daughter." As A. had altered the course of descent, by constituting him-
self a new stock as to the reversion, the inheritance went to his sister of the
whole blood.
28 See: TnrzANY, RAL PaosERTr (2nd ed.) 1891; 4 KENT's Comm. 388;
DESCENT AND DisTamruaToN, 18 C. J. 817, and cases cited.
29 !As to what property is subject to descent and distribution, see DESCENT
AND DISTRIBUTroN, 18 C. J. 811, 812, and authorities cited.
In Kean's Lessee v. Hoffecker, 2 Harr. 103, 29 Am. Dec. 336, 337 (1836), the
court said: "In England seisin is necessary to make the stock of descent, but not
so in this State. With us, title or any manner of right, legal or equitable, is
sufficient."
